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A key insight of the modern economics of organization is that
factors of production do not automatically get converted into outputs
(as the conventional neoclassical treatment of firms or farms pre-
sumes), but that the nature of organization plays a critical role in deter-
mining the input-output-labor choices. Furthermore, the precise nature
of organization itself is affected by the economic environment and it is
determined contemporaneously with other choices that individuals
make. 1
This paper focuses on the role of supervision in agricultural pro-
duction and labor transactions. It has been widely recognized that the
own labor of a farmer (farm owner or operator) is potentially different
from that of hired labor even when there is no significant difference in
their skills, and that the productivity of hired labor depends, in part, on
the extent of supervision and management provided by the farmer. This
is because l[lhe labor hired on wages has not only a possible incentive to
shirk; he (or she) also does not have the same level of commitment as
the farmer to apply his la_lior in the most productive manner.
Under the above hypothesis, the market wage faced by a farmer
do6s not entirely determine the return from his labor, because the
return depends in part on how valuable his labor is on his own farm.
The latter, in turn, is affected not only by the farmer's choice of inputs
and hired labor, but alsoby his farm size. Clearly, therefore, the extent
to which different farmers choose to work On their own farms is affect-
ed by the economic value of supervision , which in itself is endogenous.
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This paper develops and analyzes a model in which the choice of
supervision (that is, how much to_supervise and manage.)isdetermined
simultaneously with farmers' other choices, such asfamily labor supply
(on farm and outside farm), inputs and outputs. The most noteworthy
aspect of this model is that it predicts patterns of behavior, across dif-
ferent farm sizes,which arestrikingly different than those which would
arise if supervision had no economic role toplay.
Our model alsohas implications for empirical studies aswell asfor
policy analysis. An obvious consequence of the interaction between
own and hired labor is that, in anempirical analysis of farm households,
it is unsatisfactory to treat afarmer's production decisions to be separa-
ble from his consumption-leisure decisions.=.Also, a recognition of the
supervision effect requires modifications in the analysis of labor de-
mand and supply; we show, for instance, that the determinants of a
farmer's labor demand are quite different depending on whether he
supplies labor to the market or not. Wealsopoint out how supervision
effects influence the land rent on farms of different sizes;this hasimpli-
cations not only for determining farmers' real incomes, .but also for
policies aimed at land reform and land redistribution.
1. The Model
In this section, we derive the conditions which characterize the
economic choices of a farmer. Theseconditions, as we shall seein the
next section, provide a basis for examining the patterns of behavior
acrossfarmers with different characteristics..
The production technology is assumedto be linearly homogenous.
The output per unit of land,y, can thus beexpressedas
(1) y --- y (_, x)
where £ is the effective labor input (that is, labor in efficiency units) .
per unit of land, and x is the vector of nonlabor inputs per unit of
2. DeolalikarandVijverberg(1983) estimatetheaggregate Cobb-Douglas pro-
ductionfunction to testtheheterogeneity betweenhiredandown labor.Subjectto
the well-knownfundamentallimitationsin'estimatingdirectproductionfunctions,
they find own laborto be more productivethan hired labor.Unlikethe present
paper,however,they do not address the issueof howfarmers'choicesaredeter-
minedunderor areaffectedby the heterogeneity betweenthe twotypesof labor.SAH: LABOR TRANSACTIONS 16,5
land.3 The quantity of effective labor depends on how the farmer's
own (family) labor hours are combined with the hired labor hours on
the farm. If fand h respectively denote own labor hours and hired labor
hours per unit of land, then 9.isexpressedas4
(2) _ = £ (f. h)
where _ is concave and increasing in its arguments. If supervision had
no role to play, then (2) would be:.[= f + h In the presence of the
supervision effect, on the other hand, it is natural to assume that an
extra unit of own labor hour adds more to the effective labor inpu t
than what an extra unit of hired labor hour does. This is because the
farmer can do whatever a hired worker can do; in addition, the farmer
cansupervise and manage. This assumption is expressedas
(3) £ f > £h>0
where a subscript denotes, throughout the paper, the variabl_ with.
respect to which a partial derivative is being taken. Aisonote that, in
expression (2), we have assumed that the effective labor is linearly
homogeneous in its arguments; this assumption is made solely for sim-
plicity. A more general analysis is easily possible.
The time endowment of a farmer is T hours, and his land area
under operation is denoted by A > 0 A farmer's allocation of his time
entails: (i) consumption as leisure, T hours; (ii) work on his own farm,
Af hours; and (iii) hiring himself out in the market, M hours. The con-
sumption of leisure, thus, can beexpressedas
(4) T= T-Af - M.
The farm income per unit of land ispy- whh - qx, wherep is the
price of output, wh is the wage rate for the hired worker, and q is the
vector of prices of inputs. Correspondingly, the total income of a farm-
er with land areaA is
3. Ouranalysis doesnot changeif therearemultipleoutputs.
4. It shouldbeapparentthat expression(2) isnot the onlywayto represent
effectivelabor.An alternativefor instanceisto disaggregate own laborhoursinto
hoursspentonwqrkingonfarm without supervising andhoursspentonsupervision.
If s denoteshoursspentsolelyonsupervision perunit land,than_canbeexpressed
as:_ = (f - s) + #p (s,h), where_ aggregates thesupervision hoursandhiredlabor
hoursinto unitsof effectivelabor.166 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(5) / = A[py--whh--qx] + wMM
where w M is the wage rate at which the farmer can hire himself out.
Using (4) and (5), the direct utility function, of the farmer is defined,
over leisure and income, asfollows
(6) U = U (T, I )
The farmer takes the parameters (A, T,p,q,w h,w M) asgiven, and
adjusts the control variables (f, IV￿, h, x) to maximize his utility (6). The
indirect utilitylevel of the farmer can therefore beexpressedas
(7) V = Max:u(T_Af_M,A[py(£(f,h),x)_whh_qx]+wMa).
f,M,h,x
The above maximization problem can be viewed, conceptually, as con-
sisting of two parts. First, the profit per unit of land is maximized,
given a parameterically specified amount of own labor per unit of land.
This maximization can be expressd as the following conditional profit
function
(8) _(f) = Max:py(£(f, hi, x)-wl_h-q x
h_ x
Second, using the above profit function, we can rewrite the indirect
utility function (7) as
(9) V= Max: U(T-Af- M, Alr,(f) + wMM ).
f,M
Now, consider the maximization of profit on unit land, stated in
(8). The Kuhn-Tucker conditions withrespect to h and x are
(:10) ' PY ££h_<wh, h;_ 0, with complemetary slackness ss
(11) pyx _ q, x i> 0, with complementary slackness
Complementary slackness means that at least one of the two weak
inequalities in an expression must be an equality. The interpretation
of the above first order conditions is straightforward. In expressionSAH: LABOR TRANSACTIONS 167
(IO),PYe £h isthe (value of) marginal product of an hour of hired labor.
If thismarginalproduct issmaller than the wagerate for the hired work-
er, then no hired labor isemployed; that is,h =0. On the other hand, if
hired labor is employed on the farm, then its quantity is determined by
anequalization of the marginalproduct to the wageratew h
For later use,we note certain propertiesof the profit function (8).
The marginal increase.in unit •profit from expending own labor is_f(f).
For brevity in expression,we refer to lr.f(f), as marginalprofit•from own
labor. This marginal profit can be expressed,using•(8) and the envelop
theorem, as
(12) = >o
The marginal profit is positive.because.both y_and _f are positive_
Another property ,of the conditional profit function isthat it isstrictly
concavein f .5This implies.
(13). _ ff < 0 ;
that is, the marginal profit from own labor declines as more own labor
is employed on the farm. Note further from 112) that the marginal
product of effective labor can beexpressed aspy E=Trf/_f_ Substituting
this into (10), we Canrewrite this optimality condition as
(14) Tcf_h / _f < w h, h_0 with complementary slackness
The above expression hasa conceptual advantage in that, unlike (10), it
• allows us to view the choice ofh solely asa function off. In examining
the qualitative nature of a farmer's Choicesconcerning hired and own
Jabor on farm, therefore, we do notneed to pay any explicit attention
to the farmer's choices concerning nonlabor inputs.
Next, consider the farmer's supply of his labor on his own farm,
and to the market. The optimality conditions for the maximization
problem (9), with respect to fand M respectively, are
(15) _TIU I _Rf and f_0, with complementary slackness,
5. Thisfollows from the assumption thatthe technologysetisconvex and
thatthereissome possibilityof substitutionin thetechnology.168 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(16) UT / UI _w M andMi>0, withcomplementaryslackness.
Once again, the above expressions have a clear economic meaning; they
show how the allocation of a farmer's own labor is determined through
a comparison of the returns from labor to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between leisure and income_
To summarize, the optimality conditions (14), (15) and (16) com-
pletely characterize whether the labor variables f, M and h are zero or
positive for a farmer facing a given set Of parameters, and also indicate
what the magnitude of a labor variable is when it is positive. Further, as
we Shall see, it is analytically useful to view the determination of the
labor transactions of a farmer as a two-step process. First, f and M are
determined from (15) and (16). Then,h is determined from (1.4),given
the preceding, choice of f. In.the next section, we shall use the above
optimality conditions to predict the labor behavior of farmers with
different farm sizes. 6
2. Labor Transactions
For simplicityj we begin by examining the case.in which the wage
rate at which a farmer can hire himself out is the same asthe wage rate
he must .pay to employ hired workerS; that is, w h = wM Much of_this
analysis,carries over,as we shall see, to the casewhere w h and w Mare
different.
Recall that the three labor variables (.f.M., h).can take zero or
• positive values..In prjnciple, this means that there are eight possible
types of farmers depending on whether they work on their own farm or
not, whether they hire themsel.vesout or not, and whether they hire in
labor or not. Two of these eight types are ruled out because.wedo not
consider those .farms on which there is no production; that is, it isnot
possible to have f = 0, h = 0, and M/> 0.
Two more types can be ruled out becausewe show that: A farmer
would not simultaneously hire .himself out, and use hired labor on his
farm, if the wage rates for hiring in and hiring out are the same. The
economic reason behind this result is obvious. If the market value of
own and hired labor is the same, then the farmer is unequivocally
6. In predicting thesepatterns,we assume that all parameters, exceptthe
farm size,arethe samefor all farmers.Obviously,suchanassumptionisnot re-
quiredfor empiricalanalysis..SAH:LABORTRANSACTIONS 169
better-off by reducing his labor supply to the market, using these labor
hours on his own farm; and reducing the hired labor by the same num-
ber of hours. This is because own labor on farm is marginally more
productive than hired labor. To see this result formally, suppose it was
possible to haveh:>0, M _>0, andf i>0. Then, (14), (15) and (16) yield:
7_f <_UT I Ut = w M = w h =TFfl hpI f; The preceding expression, however,
entails a contradiction because of (3). Thus, it is not possible to have
h:>O,M:>O,andff _ O. Our next objective is to examine the pattern of
own labor use of the remaining types of farmer; their behavior concern-
ing hired labor is examined later.
Pattern of own labor use. Using the optimality conditions (I 5) and
(16), it is straightforward to show that a farmer must belong to one,
and only one, of the five regimes depicted in Table 1. The first regime
refers to those farmers who work on their own farm and hire themselves
out; that is, land/V/are both positive for these farmers. The correspond-
ing characterization from (15) and (16) is presented in the first row of
Table 1. Next, consider those farmers who work on their own farm, but
do not hire themselves out that is,f:> 0,and M = 0.The first order con-
ditions for these farmers, from (1 5) and (16), yield: UT/U I =;_f _wM.
The two possible characterizations for these farmer_ are, therefore,
represented as regimes 2 and 3. Similary, it can be verified that regimes
4 and 5 refer to those absentee landlords who neither work on their
own farm nor hire themselves out.
The above characterizations of regimes yield a number of results.
We show that the farm size increases as we move down the regimes in
Table 1 ; that is, farmers in regime 2 have a larger farm size than those
in regime 1. and so on. Further, within regime 1, f is a constant with
respect to farm size, but M is decreasing in farm size. On the other
hand, within regime 3, f is decreasing in farm size. The qualitative impli-
cations of theso important results can be Summarized as follows.
(i) Up to a certain farm size, own labor supply on the farm is con-
stant per unit of land_ and the numberof labor hours sold to the market
declines as the land size increases.
(ii) Above a certain farm size, farmers do not hire themselves out,
and their own labor On farmper unit land declines as the land size in-
creases. Eventually, with increasing land size, own labor supply on farm
may become zero.
To establish these results we obtain the following derivative of




Regime On Farm(f) theMarket(M) Characterization
1 + * ur/u / = _ = wM
2 + 0 UT/UI =.l_f = wM
3 + o UrlU/=_t ="_v M
4 0 0 UT/UI = _f > w M
s o o ur/ul>_ _> _M
0 UT Of _M
(17) .......... ( UI)-2 [(UIUTI-UTUII ) (lr, + A1tf -_-_-+w M .a-A- ) aA Ua
(UIUTT-U T UIT) (f + A Of OM ..... + -'- )l
34 34
and assume,that
(18)5/ < ,0,VET < ,0, and UIT = UTI>10.
Now, consider regime 1. Since _f = w M, it follows that f is fixed
within this regime. Also, 0(UT / UI ) / 0A = 0 because UT/UI .= w M
We therefore substitute af/aA = 0 into (17) and equate the resulting
expression to zero. This yields
(19) aM / 3/I < ,0,
within regime 1. Further, note that regimes 1 and 2 have identical
characterizations but M is positive in regime 1, whereas it is zero in
regime 2. From (19), therefore, a farmer in regime 1 must have a
smaller farm size than the one in regime 2.
Next, consider regime 3. Within this regime M is zero, and the
Condition for optimality is UT /UI = /l:f. A perturbation in the pre-
ceding equation with respect to A yieldsSAH: LABOR TRANSACTIONS 171
a uT at
(20) - _ff .....
aA ui aA
Substitute (l 7) into (20) and note that _M/_A = O, and/_ff is negative.
The resulting expression can be rearranged to yield
(21) afl _A < ,0,
within regime 3; The above result also allows us to compare regime 3
to regimes 2 and 4. These regimes have the same condition for opti-
mality. However, f is larger in regime 2 than in regime 3; this follows
from (1.31 and from the fact that 11:fequals w M in regime 2, whereas
_f < W/y/ in regime 3. On the other hand, fis zero in regime 4, whereas
it is positive in regime 3. From (21), therefore, a farmer in regime 3
must have a larger (respectively, smaller) farm size than a farmer in
regime 2 (respectively, regime 4).
The last comparison is that between regimes 4 and 5. In both
cases f and M are zero. Correspondingly ./I;f is fixed and, thus, Table 1
shows that.U T / U I is larger in regime 5 than in regime 4. Substituting
_f IDA = 3M/_A = _0into (17), we find that the above difference in
the magnitude of UT/.U I is possible only if the farm size in regime 5
is larger than that in reg!me4.
Pattern of hired labor use. In the beRinning of this section, we
have shown that it is not possible to have M > O and h > 0. Clearly,
therefore, farmers in regime ] do not hire workers. A parallel reasoning
shows that the sameis true in regime 2. Next, consider regimes 4 and 5.
Since farmers in these regimes do not work on their own farms, they
must hire workers because farm production is not possible otherwise.
AlSo, the hired labor per unit of land is constant across different farm
sizes within these regimes_This follows from noting that f = .0, and
that the optimality condition, _ f £h / £f = w h, determinesh asa
function of f.
The remaining regime withn which we need to investigate the
pattern of hired labor is regime 3. Within this regime, h can be zero
or positive and, from (21), f is decreasing in farm size. The relevant
issue, thus is how h is affected by a change in f. It turns out that the
answer depends critically on whether the marginal product of hired
labor decreasesor increases if the own labor input is decreased.To see
this, consider those farmers who employ hired labor. For brevity, if172 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
m (f, h ) - 7_f_hlEf denotes the marginal product of hired labor, then
the optimality condition (14) is
(22) m (f, h) = w h
Now, mh < .0;7 that is, the marginal product of hired labor declines
with hired labor. Therefore, perturbing (2-2) with respect to f and h,
and noting that _f/_A < q0,weobtain
(23) _h/_A X 0 X mf _; 0
Next, considerthe sign of mr. An increase.in own labor has two
opposite effects on the marginal product of hired labor. First, hired
labor becomesmore productive, and, thus, its marginal product declines.
Second, effective labor input increases,and, therefore, the marginal
product of hired labor increases.Hence, the sign of rnf dependson
which one of the above two effects dominates.A more direct way to
seethis ambiguity is to examine the partial derivativeof m- 1of£h/_f
with respect to f. This yields: sign (mr) = sign (7/ _ 8); where rl =
bin (£h/_f)/ _lnf > 0 is the elasticity ofthe marginalrate ofsubsti-
tution between own and hired .labor with respect to own labor; .and
- a In _f/aln f> 0 is the etasticity of the marginal profit from
own labor with respect to own labor. Substitution. Of the above ex-
pressionfor tar.into (23) yields
(24) o_h/olA >< 0 if 11XE.
The above results can be summarized as follows: (i).No hired
labor is employed, at the lower end of the distribution of farm.sizes..
(ii). Hired labor is constant per unit of land at the higher end of the
distribution of farm sizes...(iii) For those farmers in the intermediate
range of farm sizes who employ hired labor, the pattern of hired
labor isgiven by (24).
Nonuniform wages. The entire analysis presented above remains
unaffected, with one exception, if the Wagerate for hiring workers is
smaller or larger than the wage at which a_farmer can hire himself
out. The exception is that if w M exceeds wh, then it is possible that
a farmer simultaneously employs hired labor, and hires himself out.
7. This isthe second orderconditioncorresponding to (22). Alternatively,
itcanbederived fromthedefinition ofm, under theassumption that_fh _0.SAH: LABOR TRANSACTIONS 173,
Further, if sucha farmer also works on his own farm, then (14), (15),
and (16) yield
(25) _h/'_f = w H/ w M
This expression has such a remarkable property that, unlike those
encountered earlier, it does not directly involve either the utility
function or the profit (production) function. For the abovementioned
t'armers,therefore, expression(25) holdseven if the farmersarefacing
different setsof parameters(pricesand labor endowment,for example),s
3. Extensions
Household characteristics. Under the commonly madeassumption
that a household'schoices can be representedthrough the maximiza-
tion of a scalar aggregator(household utility function), it is straight-
forward to expand the above framework to include the heterogeneity
of household composition. For a given household composition, the
qualitative patterns of behavior acrossdifferent farm sizes would
continue to be similar to those identified in the previous section.
Of course; the production choicesmadeby householdswith different
characteristics but with identical farm sizes would be different. One
of the manifestations of such a difference would be that the farm size
at which farmers switch regimesin Table 1 would be determined by
the householdcomposition.9
Wages and supervision. We have assumedthat the wagerate paid
to hired workers is generated in the market, and that, in particular,
the wage rate is not directly influenced by the level of supervision
provided by the farmer. Underlying this assumption is the view that
the primary role of supervision is to improve the productivity of
hired workers .through management and coordination (see Rosen
1982)_ If, on the other hand, the primary effect of supervisionis to
reduce the on-the-job consumption of leisure by hired workers, then
it can be modelled by requiring that a contract with a hired worker
8. Fewerassumptions concerning functional forms are,thus,required inesti-
mating (25).
9. A furtherextension of themodeloutlined aboveisto treatf asavector
andallowthepossibility thatdifferenttypesof individuals (adultversus children)
mayhave significantly differentabilities tosupervise.174 : JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT.
simultaneously specify the level of supervision and the wage rate)0
Under the latter type of effect, we would expect farmers with larger
farm size or smaller family size (who are able to provide less super-
vision) to pay lower wages to hired workers. 11
4. Concluding Remarks
Though the critical role that supervision of hired labor plays in
private farming has long been recognized, this phenomenon has not
been adequately integrated in the theory and empirical analysis of farm
behavior. The present paper provides a basis for such an integration by
explicitly modelling the role and the determinants of supervision. We
use this model to predict the patterns of labor transactions (that is,
the quantity of own labor hired out versus used on farm, and the
quantity of hired labor employed on farm), and demonstrate that
these patterns are strikingly different than those which one would
observe if supervision had no economic role to play.
A forceful example of how policy analysis is affected by an
explicit recognition of supervision effects is provided by the issue of
land rent. In the conventional model with no supervision effects, a
standard implication of the constant returns to scale in production
is that the unit land rent (net profit per unit land) is independent
of the farm size. Naturally, therefore, there is no direct efficieno/
gain or loss, under this model, from a change in the distribution of land.
In contrast, the unit land rent can be quite different_for different
farmers in the presence of supervision effects. Specifically, it can be
easily shown that the land rent is a decreasing function of farm size,
at least within certain ranges of farm sizes. The economic reasoning
is straightforward. Own labor is a fiXed resource which is applied with
10. Under each contract, supervisiondetermines the probability of detecting
shirking behavior. This, in combination with the hired worker's cost of being
laid off and his (market determined) expected utility, yields the correspondence
between the supervision level and the wage rate. See Calvo (1984), Ordover and
Shapiro (1984), and referencestherein.
11. Another possible generalization isto incorporate the possibility that there
is a spectrum of skills among hired workers (who can be hired at different wages,
given any level of supervision), and that the efficacy of supervisionis different for
different types of skilled workers. Such a generalization would provide an endoge-
nous selection of the types of hired workers which a farmer hires.SAH: LABORTRANSACTIONS 175
less-intensity (that is_hours of own labor on unit land decline) asfarm
size increases.Further, the substitution of own labor by hired labor
becomes increasingly more expensive as the intensity of the former
declines. As a consequence, the economic value of an additional unit
of land declines with increasing farm size.12
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